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This article argues that modern 
international sales law has a hybrid 
character as it increasingly makes 
provision for interfaces between public 
and private, State and non-State, hard 
and soft , law. Although private forms of 
regulation are often associated with the 
lex mercatoria, this article shows that 
they rarely reflect or constitute 
mercantile custom or trade usage. 
However, they often address issues that 
State law does not. As a result, these 
forms of regulation have become an 
effective tool in supply chains, especially 
in the context of sustainable 
development. Whether private forms of 
regulation constitute law is a matter for 
debate, though. This article concludes 
that in the context of international sales, 
private forms of regulation mostly obtain 
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their legitimacy through contract, which “hardens” them into law.  
Keywords:  Private regulation; international sales; sustainable development 
1. BACKGROUND 
Despite differing opinions, the preponderant view is that international trade can 
support economic growth and consequently serves as a tool for social and economic 
development and the alleviation of poverty. However, to be sustainable, development 
needs to take place within the framework of the law.1 Unfortunately, the international 
nature of trans-border transactions creates challenges for legal regulation. As law is 
territorial in nature, State based law is often incapable of addressing the needs of 
international trade in full;2 in some instances even inhibiting international trade.3 
Differences in national laws lead to uncertainty and complications  in establishing the 
law of the contract.4 As uniform law does not always provide a complete or ideal 
solution, there is a need for other forms of regulation. Globalisation, therefore, has been 
a major catalyst for privately generated rules and norms.5 In an effort to address the 
problems and shortcomings connected to national law, contractual parties often resort 
to framework, master, standard form and model contracts, or to mercantile custom and 
trade usage.  
The notion of private law-making6 is nothing new as already in the Middle Ages 
merchants regulated their own transactions according to the practices, usages and 
customs of their trades. The ancient lex mercatoria functioned as an autonomous system 
of law based on transnational mercantile customs, general principles and procedural 
procedures, and was enforced through social sanction within the networks of 
 
1  See the 2030 United Nations (UN) Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Doc A/Res/70/1, 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) No 16.3. 
2  Eiselen S “Globalization and harmonization of international trade law” in M Faure & A Van der Walt 
(eds) Globalization and private law: the way forward (2010) 97 at 97-8. See also Smits J “The future of 
contract law in Europe” (2015) Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No 2125/2 1 
at 12-13 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566149 (accessed 9 April 2019) .   
3  For example, increases in import tariffs or attempts to retreat from globalised regulation, such as, 
international trade agreements or economic unions. The conduct of the USA President and Brexit are 
typical examples here. See also Quinn PS “Regulation in the shadows of private law” (2018) 28 Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law 327 at 330. 
4  Eiselen (2010) at 99; Cafaggi F “New foundations of transnational private regulation” (2011) 38(1) 
Journal of Law and Society 20 at 25.  
5  Maurer A “The creation of transnational law – participatory legitimacy of privately created norms” 
(2012) Center for Transnational Studies (ZenTra) of the Universities of Bremen and Oldenburg Working 
Papers in Transnational Law No 03/2012 1 at 13 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179584 
(accessed 9 April 2019) . See also Schiek D “Private rule-making and European governance – issues of 
legitimacy” (2007) European Law Review 443 at 445. 
6  Not to be confused with private law, a branch of State law that deals with the private relationships 
between natural and juristic persons.  
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merchants or by specialised merchant courts.7 Supporters of a new law merchant seek 
to revive the notion of a separate legal order regulating transnational commerce that is 
functionally equivalent to State law.8 However, proponents of the new lex mercatoria 
hold different opinions on its content, and its ability to function autonomously outside 
the State. Some of them are of the view that the new law merchant is not fully 
autonomous from State law but acts within its boundaries, often in supplementation of 
State law. According to this view, the law merchant is no longer a mere spontaneous but 
also haphazard body of merchant customs and usages, but  is formulated and expressed 
in authoritative texts formulated by international organisations and agencies and then 
incorporated into national law by State action, alternatively into contracts through 
party agreement.9 When it comes to the regulation of international sales, the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is one of its 
main sources. Mercantile custom and general principles of law when codified by 
international organisations, such as, the International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) 
Incoterms® rules or the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law’s 
(UNIDROIT) Principles of International Commercial Contracts, are other sources.  
Internationally, there has been a steady rise in autonomous private regulatory 
bodies, so much so that private authority is now operating alongside public authority. 
Moreover, a substantial body of scholarship has developed on private regulation, not 
only in the context of international commercial transactions and related fields, but also 
in other areas of the law.10 In addressing the inadequacies of State law, private forms of 
transnational regulation encompass much more than mere uncodified and spontaneous 
custom. Nevertheless, they are often discussed and analysed against the background of 
the lex mercatoria11 or global legal pluralism.12 In EU private law, privately generated 
 
7  Cuniberti G “Three theories of lex mercatoria” (2014) 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369 at 
374. See also DiMatteo LA “Soft law and the principle of fair and equitable decision making in 
international contract arbitration” 2013 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 221 at 226; Yuan B “A law 
and economics approach to norms in transnational commercial transactions: incorporation and 
internalisation” (August 2016) 1 Erasmus Law Review 5 at 10. 
8  Michaels R “The true lex mercatoria: law beyond the state” (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 447 at 454-455.  
9  Schmitthoff CM “The unification of the law of international trade” in Cheng J (ed) CM Schmitthoff”s select 
essays on international trade law (1988) 170 at 171–172. See also Maniruzzaman AFM “The lex 
mercatoria and international contracts: a challenge for international commercial arbitration” (1999) 14 
American University International Law Review 657 at 671–672. 
10  Such as : canon or church law; rules that regulate sports and games; conduct rules of homeowner 
associations; standards or technical rules set by various standard-setting organisations; regulations of 
the professions set by their own professional bodies; rules that regulate the use of credit cards; rules of 
the stock exchange, and collective labour agreements, to name but a few. See in general, Schiek (2007); 
Cafaggi F “The many features of transnational private rule-making: unexplored relationships between 
custom, jura mercatorum and global private regulation” (2015) 36 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law 875. 
11  See generally Cafaggi (2015); DiMatteo (2013); Cuniberti (2014). 
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law fulfils a central role.13 Lately, much of the scholarship on private regulation focuses 
on the voluntary acceptance of privately formulated standards pertaining to health, 
safety, labour and the environment, which includes aspects of social corporate 
responsibility and sustainable development.14 Research on private regulation also 
extends to fields other than the law.15 However, many of the issues discussed there are 
universal in nature and cross-cutting , and, therefore, can apply to the legal context too.  
One of the main concerns is the normative quality of privately generated rules, and 
whether they constitute “law” as traditionally understood. Is it enough that their users 
feel bound to these rules, and that as a result they have the same effect as law although 
they are not law per se? Alternatively, do they function as a separate and autonomous 
system of law, or in the context of commercial transactions as part of the lex mercatoria? 
Moreover, can law exist independently of the State? If so, does privately made law 
function in parallel with, or perhaps in competition with, State law? Fears have been 
expressed that privately made law might signify a movement away from the State in an 
effort to claim autonomy from it. This could mean a move away from the public interest 
in favour of private interests. However, private regulatory frameworks do not 
exclusively exist outside the State. The State often delegates legislative power to private 
authorities or outsources certain functions to private bodies.16 Private actors, 
furthermore, participate in the formulation of national and international legislation as 
advisors or observers.17 In the creation of international uniform sales law instruments, 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the United Nations Commission 
on Trade Law (UNCITRAL) are probably the most known intergovernmental bodies to 
formulate international conventions or model laws that ultimately will function as State 
law. International organisations of non-State actors, such as UNIDROIT, on the other 
 
12  Berman PS “Global legal pluralism” (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 1155 at 1155; Berman 
PS “The evolution of global legal pluralism”  in Cotterel R & Del Mar (eds) Authority in transnational 
legal theory: theorizing across disciplines Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2016) 151 at 154. 
13  See Schiek (2007); Mak V “Private actors as norm-setters. On new legal pluralism in European 
regulatory private law and how to manage it” 2015 Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series No. 02/2015 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566672 (accessed 9 April 2019); Mak V 
“Who does what in European private law – and how is it done? An experimentalist perspective” 2017 
Tilburg Private Law Working Paper Series No 05/2017 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2958146 
(accessed 9 April 2019). 
14  Quinn (2018); Scheltema M “Balancing public and private regulation (2016) 12(1) Utrecht Law Review 
16; McAllister LK “Harnessing private regulation” (2014) 3 Michigan Journal of Environmental and 
Administrative Law 291. See also Beckers A “Regulating corporate regulators through contract law? 
The case of corporate social responsibility” 2016 EUI Working Papers Max Weber Programme (MWP) 
2016/12 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2789360 (accessed 9 April 2019).    
15  Such as, philosophy, theology, anthropology, social norms theory, political theory, or the interfaces 
between law and other norms, such as, ethnic, tribal, institutional or religious norms. See Berman 
(2016) at 152-154. 
16  Schiek (2007) at 453.  
17 Such as, international business organisations, trade associations, transnational corporations, lawyers 
and academics. See Schiek (2007) at 453. In the context of the USA, see Snyder DV “Private lawmaking” 
(2003) 64 Ohio State Law Journal 371 at 377-384. 
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hand, are better known for the creation of general principles of law that function on a 
voluntary basis through party agreement or as an interpretative tool. Contract is the 
main vehicle through which instruments formulated by non-State actors operate. As 
most legal systems recognise party autonomy and freedom of contract, once 
incorporated by contract these rules and standards operate as contract terms. This 
generates a complementary relationship between State and non-State law. However, 
would a pluralist global framework that combines State and non-State law undermine 
the stability and predictability of the rule of law or the democratic principles on which it 
is built? These issues unavoidably raise the questions of what is law, and, more 
specifically, what the sources of transnational commercial law are, especially in the 
context of sustainable development. 
Although scholarship on private forms of regulation is on the increase, the 
indiscriminate use of terms, such as, private regulation, private ordering, self-
regulation, private governance, self-governance, private rule-making, private law-
making, non-State law, transnational commercial norms, or soft law, often makes it 
difficult to distinguish whether these rules and norms function as law or merely as an 
informal means of regulation. One scholar suggests that a distinction must be made. In 
his view, “self-ordering” and “self-regulation” refer to rules or norms that are 
formulated and followed by the members of a closed group for their sole use but which 
have no legal force for parties outside of the group.18 “Privately-made law”, “non-State 
law”, “transnational norms” and “soft law”, on the other hand, refer to privately made 
rules, norms and standards that have general application.19 These rules find their 
legitimacy through competition with other rules, whether privately made or State 
made,20 or in processes and procedures that resemble those followed by the State when 
making law and, therefore, they are treated as such. In these cases, their legitimacy 
would depend on consent by all concerned, both on a substantial and a procedural 
level.21 However, whether these rules amount to law in the traditional sense is still a 
matter for debate.22  
This article refers to “private regulation” as a generic term to include all forms of 
rules, norms and standards formulated by non-State or quasi-State organisations, 
whether they are considered to be law or not. “Regulation”, furthermore, refers to three 
elements, namely, the setting, implementation and enforcement of private forms of 
standards, norms or rules.23  
Despite uncertainty about their legal status, it is clear that private forms of 
regulation are closing the traditional divide between private and public law. They are no 
longer restricted to matters of private law but increasingly regulate matters of social 
 
18 Snyder (2003) at 401-403. See also Scheltema (2016) at 16.  
19 Snyder (2003) at 404-406. 
20 Snyder (2003) at 424.  
21 Schiek (2007) at 450. 
22 See Schiek (2007) at 444.This aspect is discussed in more detail in the course of this article. 
23 See McAllister (2014) at 298-301. 
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interest traditionally left to the domain of the State, such as, human rights and 
environmental concerns. Consequently, the new law merchant contains elements from 
private as well as public law.24 As private forms of regulation mostly apply voluntarily 
through contractual incorporation, it has furthermore caused a shift in the traditional 
role of contract, namely to maximise wealth. Contract has now also become a regulatory 
instrument based on good faith, fair dealing and public policy in order to promote 
sustainable development and distributive justice.   
This article will show that, in the transnational context, there is a need to 
conceptualise law differently from the traditional notion of being State law, to include 
also private forms of regulation. This discussion will focus specifically on the role of 
private regulation in the context of international sales transactions. These contracts 
often form part of an extended global supply chain where suppliers or places of 
production are located in developing countries. The article commences with an 
examination of the rationale for privately made law, followed by a discussion of the 
main forms of private regulation as applied in the context of international sales 
contracts. The aim of this article is not to present an in-depth analysis of the role of 
contract as an instrument of private governance; therefore, only brief reference will be 
made to the shortcomings of contract law doctrine in the context of global supply chains 
as that warrants an article of its own. What it does wish to accomplish is to show that 
there is a need to re-conceptualise the notion of international sales law so that it 
recognises its inherent hybrid character and the various interfaces between public and 
private, State and non-State, as well as hard and soft, law.  
2. THE RATIONALE FOR PRIVATE REGULATION 
As neo-liberal theory envisages less involvement of governments in economic activity, it 
largely facilitated the notion of private regulation.25 In addition, the diminished power 
of the State, but also the costliness of State power, encouraged private forms of 
regulation.26 Supply and demand models can further explain why certain aspects are left 
to private regulators whilst others remain within the realm of the State.27  
In the context of international commercial transactions, the challenges that 
economic globalisation pose to the link between law and State are often the drivers of 
initiatives for private regulation.28 Not only can it be difficult to determine the 
governing law of an international contract of sale,29 laws can also be divergent on a 
particular aspect, which can create legal uncertainty.30 Moreover, the national character 
 
24 DiMatteo (2013) at 7. See also Kjaer PF “From the private to the public to the private? Historicizing the 
evolution of public and private authority” (2018) 25(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies at 13-36. 
25  Büthe T “Private regulation in the global economy: A (p)review” (2010) 12 Business and Politics 1 at 6. 
26  Snyder (2003) at 423. 
27 Büthe (2010) at 6. See also in general Cafaggi F “The regulatory functions of transnational commercial 
contracts new architectures” (2013) 36 Fordham International Law Journal 1557 at 1557. 
28  Maurer (2012) at 1; Büthe (2010) at 4. 
29  The fact that the rules of private international law are not unified exacerbates the problem.  
30  See Eiselen (2010) at 99; Cafaggi (2011) at 25.  
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of law can become an obstacle to international trade if not geared to the needs of cross-
border sales,31 especially where the laws are antiquated.32 Uniform sales laws do not 
always provide a complete or ideal solution to these problems. The compromise and 
static natures of uniform law can place further limitations on their scope for 
regulation.33 Furthermore, the need for uniform law to be interpreted uniformly in 
order to be effective can be an additional challenge.34  
Non-State actors can act as political-economic actors when producing rules that the 
market requires but which the State fails to provide.35 As law is slow and reactive in 
nature, national law often finds it difficult to keep up with developments in 
international trade.36 Electronic commerce and the effects of technology, as well as new 
forms in which business is conducted, such as, supply chains, value-added products and 
inter-organisational trade, together with an increasing demand for sustainable and 
socially responsible trade practices, necessitate special forms of regulation. That is 
especially so where State law fails to regulate or does so inadequately. Even when 
regulated by the State, such regulation will be restricted to the territorial boundaries of 
that State. Moreover, when it comes to supply chains, State regulation in the country of 
the buyer or manufacturer could be different from that in the country of the seller or 
producer. International conventions or other forms of cooperation among State 
regulators take long to negotiate and sometimes even longer to adopt, and, therefore, 
are not always effective options.  
Therefore, from a cost and organisational perspective, private regulatory efforts 
have definite advantages as they standardise business transactions and reduce 
transaction costs.37 Compared to State law, or to conventions that are products of 
diplomatic compromise, privately generated rules produced by industry players and 
experts can be more efficient.38 They are often better suited to the needs of a particular 
trade, whilst State law and international conventions have to regulate a wide range of 
trades and as a result  are often vague and broadly worded. Privately made rules can 
produce more efficient rules as it is much easier to reach agreement when the drafters 
represent similar interests, whilst in the case of international conventions, the focus is 
often on reconciling differences through compromise. The flexible nature of private 
regulation is another advantage.39 As they are mostly voluntary, contractual parties can 
choose whether they want to adopt these rules. They can furthermore deviate from 
 
31  Smits (2015) at 12-13. 
32  Revisions made in the main legal system are often not transposed into the law of the colonised country 
after independence, resulting in its laws becoming static. 
33  For example, in the case of the CISG, diplomatic compromises left several external gaps that need to be 
filled with reference to the national applicable law. See Art 7(2) CISG. 
34  See Cafaggi (2011) at 26. 
35 Büthe (2010) at 1. 
36 Eiselen (2010) at 97. 
37 Cafaggi (2015) at 879. 
38 Mak (2015) at 2. 
39 See Snyder (2003) at 421; Mak (2015) at 2. 
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them by agreement or even opt for another set of rules if available. It is also easier to 
reform privately made rules when there is a need to adapt them to changes in 
international commercial practices.40 Where different sets of private regulation are 
available, market competition will ensure that ineffective rules are replaced, or at least 
that the most effective rules will reign.41 Moreover, publicly made law often follows the 
example of a private rule-maker when adapting national law to new developments, 
which reaffirms the efficiency of privately made rules.42 
State institutions may find it difficult to enforce transnational rules or to monitor 
compliance with international standards, especially in supply chains.43 Informal or 
private measures of enforcement by means of market prices, reputational damage or 
exclusion from a group can be more effective and, therefore, often preferred by those 
who transact in groups and chains where reputation carries much weight.44 The 
Internet is a very effective tool as it provides instant access to information around the 
globe and, as a result, it is ideal for enforcing reputational sanctions.45 Furthermore, 
transnational private rules can contain their own innovative implementation and 
enforcement procedures and techniques that are better geared to the international 
context.46 
Despite the many advantages of private regulation, there are a number of concerns. 
Where private rules address the weaknesses in conventional international public or 
private law, they operate in conjunction with State law in a hybrid relationship. Where 
State and non-S law exist in the same area, a proliferation of lawmakers might induce 
fragmented law, which in turn creates competition and legal uncertainty.47 However, 
the same would happen where there are competitive transnational private rules in 
place.48 Therefore, there is a need to manage pluralist systems, for example, by 
providing clear conflict of laws rules for the interaction between different forms of 
private regulation or between private regulation and State law.49 Party agreement can 
also serve to manage fragmentism. 
Even if the advantages of private regulation were to outweigh the disadvantages, 
privately generated rules would only be effective if they enjoy a form of normativity or 
 
40 Snyder (2003) at 436. 
41 Snyder (2003) at 421 & 424. 
42 Snyder (2003) at 421. For example, the 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce forms the 
basis of most countries’ national laws on electronic commerce. 
43 Cafaggi (2011) at 26-27. 
44 Snyder (2003) at 430; Smits (2015) at 15.       
45 Smits (2015) at 15; Mak (2017) at 6. 
46 Cafaggi (2011) at 27. 
47 Mak (2015) at 2. 
48 Cafaggi (2011) at 25. 
49 Mak (2015) at 3; Scheltema (2016) at 23. 
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are respected and legitimised as law.50 This brings us to the question: what is law? The 
answer might differ depending on whether you consider it from the perspective of the 
State or that of commerce. According to the classic theory of law, which originated in 
Western legal systems of the civil and common law, only the State can confer legal 
authority on private actors for purposes of making law.51 Privately made rules would 
therefore only obtain the force of law once incorporated into national law,52 through use 
by the courts,53 as contract terms,54 or as custom or trade usage when meeting stringent 
requirements.55 On the other hand, from a commercial perspective, the focus is often 
placed on the functionality and efficiency of a rule or norm.56  
Therefore, in international commerce, the dividing lines primarily lie in different 
trades and industries and not so much along State lines.57 Rules, norms and standards 
that a particular trade or industry perceive as binding internationally would constitute 
the normative framework for international transactions in that trade or industry. 
However, the question is whether they would bind anyone from outside? Moreover, are 
these rules fair? Some scholars argue that it is not enough that rules merely have the 
effect of law. For them, the legitimacy and accountability of these rules are a point of 
concern.58 Unlike State law and international conventions, which are products of 
democratic law-making processes, the processes that give rise to private forms of 
regulation might not be open to public scrutiny. Therefore, they may run the risk of 
becoming paternalistic and exclusive.59 However, often there are processes at work in 
the creation of privately generated rules that can confer legitimacy on them. That would 
enable a distinction between rules that purely function as a form of self-regulation or 
private ordering and rules that would constitute privately made law. Moreover, in the 
context of international contracts of sale, contractual agreement on private forms of 
regulation, or their incorporation through trade usage, can also confer legitimacy on 
these forms of regulation so that they become binding. The next part will focus in more 
detail on contract as a vehicle for providing private forms of regulation. 
 
50 Smits (2015) at 13 refers to Jansen N The making of legal authority (2010) who places the emphasis on 
the users that regard them as binding and therefore as legitimate. 
51 See Maurer (2012) at 9. 
52 Privately created rules and standards that are acceptable to everyone in the community, industry or 
group can be transferred into national law by way of a bottom-up approach. See generally Levit JK “A 
bottom-up approach to international lawmaking: the tale of three trade finance instruments” (2005) 30 
Yale Journal of International Law at 125-209. See also Michaels (2007) at 461. 
53 Yuan (2016) at 8 refers to social norms turned into judicial precedent or common law doctrine. 
54 Mak (2015) at 7. 
55 Goode R “Usage and its reception in transnational commercial law” (1997) 46 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 7-8. See also Mak (2015) at 7. 
56 See Michaels (2007) at 463-4; Schwartz A & Scott RE “Contract theory and the limits of contract law” 
(2003) 113 The Yale Law Journal 541 at 545.  
57 Michaels (2007) at 465. 
58 Maurer (2012) at 9; Mak (2015) at 2. 
59 Snyder (2003) at 431. 
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3. PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SALES: LEGAL 
NATURE AND STATUS  
3.1. Negotiated contracts and contract clauses  
Contract is the most basic form of private regulation.60 Most national laws allow private 
parties to design their own contracts by virtue of party autonomy and the principle of 
freedom of contract. South African law underlines this freedom as part of the 
fundamental rights protected by Chapter 2 of the Constitution.61  
However, as it is time-consuming to negotiate every term of the contract and it 
increases the costs of the transaction,62 gaps are often left, which are to be filled by the 
default law of the contract.63 A choice of law that is best suited for the gap-filling task 
together with a choice of forum are the simplest forms of private regulation.64 This is 
also an easy way of substituting State law that would otherwise be ill-suited to the 
needs of international trade in general or the transaction in particular. Furthermore, a 
significant number of international commercial contracts choose to have disputes heard 
by arbitral tribunals instead of State courts as they can address the parties’ concerns 
related to unfamiliar, inefficient or corrupt court systems more effectively. Although 
most contracts contain a choice-of-law clause that incorporates national law, arbitrators 
can also use rules of law or so-called a-national law to adjudicate commercial disputes.65 
General principles of international trade or the lex mercatoria are examples of such non-
State rules.66  
Does that suggest that contracts which provide for dispute resolution by means of 
international commercial arbitration are a source of autonomous privately made law? 
Although State courts generally recognise and enforce arbitral awards, that does not 
mean they endorse their findings as privately made law.67 The notion of an autonomous 
contract regards contract as an institution that functions as an autonomous system of 
 
60 Cuniberti (2014) at 475.  
61 The right to individual freedom, equality and dignity and economic freedom (ss 9-12 & 22 of the 
Constitution 1996) are examples of fundamental values echoed in the general principles underlying the 
law of SA contract, such as, freedom to contract, private autonomy, public policy, good faith, boni mores, 
reasonableness, fairness etc. See Van der Merwe S, Van Huyssteen LF, Reinecke MFB & Lubbe GF 
Contract: general principles 5th ed (2016) 11. 
62 Snyder (2003) at 423. 
63 Eiselen (2010) at 98. 
64 Smits (2015) at 12. However, this could give rise to legal tourism or forum shopping.   
65 Goode (1997) at 6-7. According to Michaels (2007) at 456, that happens rarely. 
66 Smits (2015) at 13. Whether State courts would be prepared to recognise a-national law as the 
governing law of a contract is doubtful . It is also unlikely that non-State law could regulate a contract in 
full without being supplemented by State law.  
67 Flanagan PM “Demythologising the law merchant: the impropriety of the lex mercatoria as a choice of 
law” 2004 International Company and Commercial Law Review 297 at 300. 
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law based on the will of the parties.68 The autonomous contract, furthermore, derives its 
legitimacy from the fact that contractual disputes are adjudicated by an independent 
institutionalised system of arbitrators. Critics of this approach rightly point out that this 
might explain why an individual contract would be binding on the parties thereto – in 
other words, a form of self-regulation - but it would not explain why it would function 
as an autonomous system of law.69 Law must have general application and should not 
merely regulate the behaviour of parties to a particular contract as that would only 
amount to a form of self-regulation.70 Contracts generally obtain their legitimacy from 
State law through that law’s recognition of the principles of party autonomy and 
freedom of contract. Contract, therefore, cannot function as an autonomous source of 
law, but only as an institution supplementing State law.71 At the same time, national law 
would always supplement contracts, either as default law or as a choice of law. What 
makes contract efficient as a private form of regulation is that the parties thereto can 
order their contractual relationship without State intervention by means of private or 
informal enforcement mechanisms, for example by withholding payment of a final 
instalment to ensure full performance by the other party, or requiring a deposit before 
making delivery.72 Moreover, a properly drafted contract that is clear on the obligations 
of the parties can easily and effectively deter disputes and avoid the need for State 
mechanisms to intervene. 
3.2 Standard form contracts 
The main aim of standard form contracts is to reduce transaction costs by providing 
greater legal certainty, and to cater for specific needs.73 For that reason, multinational 
business corporations regularly make use of standard contracts, together with 
framework or master contracts, especially in the context of global supply chains. Mostly, 
standard terms are formulated unilaterally where after they are imposed on the other 
party to the contract. Consequently, standard form contracts are often criticised for 
being one-sided, coercive, unfair, or against public policy.74 Problems can also arise 
where both parties to the contract have their own sets of standard terms, especially if 
those terms are conflicting.75 However, if they reflect fair terms of business, these 
contracts can save time and money and provide a de facto legal framework within which 
the parties can operate.  
 
68 Michaels (2007) at 449-450 with reference to Teubner G “‘Global bukowina’: legal pluralism in the 
world society” in Teubner G (ed) Global law without a state Brookfield: Dartmouth (1997) at 3-28. 
69 Michaels (2007) at 450. See also Snyder (2003) at 403 & 404-405; Goode R “Rule, practice, and 
pragmatism in transnational commercial law” (2005) 3 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
539 at 547.  
70 See the distinction made by Snyder (2003) at 401-405. 
71 Goode (2005) at 547-548; Cuniberti (2014) at 375.  
72 Smits (2015) at 14-15.  
73 Snyder (2003) at 423; Maurer (2012) at 5. 
74 Maurer (2012) at 5. 
75 This dilemma is commonly referred to as the battle of the forms. 
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Trade and merchant associations often make use of standard form contracts to 
codify or standardise the practices, usages and customs of their trades. These contracts 
are industry driven and restricted to members of that trade or industry.76 Unlike 
standard contracts of private entities, their terms are not formulated by one of the 
parties to the contract and then imposed on the other, but are made by representatives 
of the trade or industry for the use of all parties to the contract.77 They, furthermore, 
often provide their own enforcement mechanisms. These create self-regulatory 
normative frameworks that can operate without intervention of State institutions.78 
However, despite their elaborate self-regulatory nature, the standard form contracts of 
major international trade associations in the commodity trade, such as, the Grain and 
Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) and the Federation of Oils, Seeds & Fats Association 
(FOSFA), do so within the framework of national law.79 Although these standard 
contracts could be regarded as a source of the lex mercatoria,80 it is not the intention of 
major trade associations to move entirely outside State law and create an autonomous 
normative order of their own.81  
The rules contained in such contracts still operate as contractual terms within the 
framework of the applicable law of the contract. Although these rules may have the 
effect of law for the parties to the contract, they merely constitute a form of self-
regulation or ordering and do not operate as an autonomous source of law. Unlike these 
contracts, legal rules are not exclusive to a particular trade but have to be available to 
everyone.82 Furthermore, rules or norms will normally only be dignified as law if they 
are created through a democratic participatory process in which all stakeholders with 
competing interests, as well as those who could potentially be affected by the rule, take 
part in the bargaining process.83 Therefore, where a governing trade association 
produces the terms of a standard contract unilaterally, it would not qualify as law per se. 
However, for the parties to that contract it provides the legal framework within which 
they operate. 
It is often said that standard form contracts reflect, or even create, international 
mercantile custom.84 However, research conducted in different trades regulated by 
trade associations found that it is very difficult to identify consistent customs in the 
 
76 Cafaggi (2011) at 32.  
77 Snyder (2003) 405. 
78  Bernstein L “Merchant law in a merchant court: rethinking the Code’s search for immanent business 
norms” (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1765 at 1771-1777 & 1818-1820. 
79 In the case of the GAFTA and FOSFA standard contracts, they exclude the CISG in favour of English law. 
80 Goode (2005) at 546. 
81 Cuniberti (2014) at 375 & 428. The ICC Model Sales Contract, for example, uses the CISG as the default 
law of the contract. 
82 Snyder (2003) at 404-405. 
83 That would be closest to the democratic process that affords State law  legitimacy. See Schiek (2007) at 
452; Maurer (2012) at 5, 7 & 9-11; Snyder (2003) at 432-433. 
84 Basedow J “The state’s private law and the economy – commercial law as an amalgam of public and 
private rule-making” (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 703 at 708-709. 
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trades where they operate.85 Furthermore, it was found that their rules rarely reflect 
customs of the trade but that the trade association formulated such rules for purposes 
of efficiency. When found to be inadequate, the association will make a point of 
amending them for future use.86 Regular revision makes it difficult for these rules to 
develop into mercantile custom as such amendments prevent the creation of regularly 
observed and consistent practices. Furthermore, special tribunals instituted by trade 
associations seldom rely on unwritten custom to resolve disputes but, instead, make use 
of the detailed provisions contained in the association’s standard form contract. 
On the other hand, an independent third party formulates standard contracts of 
international business organisations, such as those of the ICC. The ICC is an 
international business organisation that promotes the interests of international 
business in general. Unlike international trade associations, it does not have an 
affiliation with a particular trade or industry. Therefore, its contracts neither constitute 
terms imposed by one contract party on the other, nor are they restricted to certain 
trades, but they are the result of a participatory process that involves interested parties 
from different trades and connected sectors. Notwithstanding, views still differ on 
whether the ICC’s standards and guidelines constitute privately made law. The Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), a set of ICC rules that banks 
consistently contract into, often serves as an example in this regard. One view holds 
that, as they are wellknown and regularly observed as a method of payment by the 
majority of traders making use of international documentary credits, they have 
obtained the status of international commercial custom or trade usage.87 Whether that 
is true for the set of terms as a whole is uncertain, though.88 Another view is to regard 
them as privately made law.89 Although some scholars support the latter view,90 others 
have questioned the democratic nature of the ICC’s processes. They argue that, in the 
making of  the rules, the organisation does not involve all stakeholders who might 
potentially be affected by them.  
The process is often technical in nature, and often it is merely practitioners in the 
field and members of the ICC who are responsible for formulating the rules and 
 
85 Bernstein L “Merchant law in a modern economy” (2013) University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute 
for Law and Economics Working Paper No 639 (2nd series) available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2242490 (accessed 9 April 2019) at 2-3. 
86 Bernstein (1996) at 1775-1779 with reference to the position of the National Grain and Feed 
Association (NGFA). 
87 Dalhuisen JH “Custom and its revival in transnational private Law” (2008) 18 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 339 at 356. 
88 Goode (2005) at 550. See also Snyder (2003) at 393-394. 
89 Snyder (2003) at 393. See also Calliess G-P and Jarass IS “Private uniform law and global legal 
pluralism: the case of ICC’s Incoterms and UCP” (2018) The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College 
London, Transnational Law Institute Think! Paper 12/2018 at 21 , available at 
https//ssrn.com/abstract=3184731 (accessed 9 April 2019) . 
90 Snyder (2003) at 405; Calliess & Jarass (2018) at 14 & 21. 
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standards.91 Another opinion holds that there is no need for transnational law to be 
subjected to the same level of democratic processes required of national law. According 
to this argument, the normativity of a rule is determined by whether a range of 
interested parties participated in its creation; that these stakeholders found the rule 
generally acceptable and agreed on its content; and that there is always an opportunity 
of revising such rule or norm at a later stage when needed.92 Measured by this standard, 
most instruments formulated by the ICC would qualify as law. However, as the ICC does 
not have any statutory authority, all of their standard contracts, rules, norms and 
standards are voluntary in nature and incorporated by agreement. Once agreed to, they 
are binding on the parties.93 That would mean that, in practice, the ICC’s standard forms 
of contract obtain their legal force through party agreement, unless it can be proven 
that they constitute mercantile custom or trade usage. Even then, most legal systems 
will treat them as implied terms of the contract. This can be explained by reference to 
the ICC’s Incoterms® rules.  
The prevailing opinion is that the Incoterms® rules operate as standard contract 
terms.94 However, in connection with earlier editions of the rules, scholarly opinion held 
that the FOB, CIF and CFR Incoterms® rules might constitute international mercantile 
custom.95 Arbitral tribunals also regularly applied them as such.96 Courts in the USA 
almost routinely incorporate the Incoterms® rules as an Article 9(2) international trade 
 
91 Cafaggi (2011) at 33-34; Cafaggi (2015) at 924. 
92 See Maurer (2012) at 7 & 10-11 with reference to Ochoa C “The relationship of participatory 
democracy to participatory law formation” (2008) 15 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5 at 16 and 
Calliess G-P & Zumbansen P Rough consensus and running code. A theory of transnational private law 
(2010).   
93 Cafaggi (2015) at 879.   
94 Rowe MC “The contribution of the ICC to the development of international trade law” in Horn N &  
Schmitthoff CM (eds) The transnational law of international commercial transactions II (1992) 51 at 51 
& 52. See also Eiselen S “Scope of CISG” in LA DiMatteo et al (eds) International sales law: contract 
principles & practice (2016) at 91 at para 15.  
95 Basedow (2008) at 710; Dalhuisen (2008) at 356; Rowe (1992) at 53; Ramberg J “Incoterms® 2010” 
(2011) 29 Penn State International Law Review 415 at 423.  
96 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Case No CISG/1997/09 of 
24 April 1997 available at http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/china-international-economic-trade-
arbitration-association-cietac-prc-60 (accessed 14 September 2017); China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Case No CISG/1997/16 of 25 June 1997 available at 
http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/china-june-25-1997-translation-available) (accessed 28 July 2017); 
China International Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) (PRC) Case No CISG/1999/20 
of 7 April 1999 available at http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/china-april-7-1999-translation-available 
(accessed 10 November 2017); Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian 
Federation Chamber of Commerce Case No 406/1998 of 6 June 2000 available at 
http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/russian-federation-june-6-2000-translation-available (accessed 24 
May 2017); The International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Russian Federation Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Case No 105/2005 of 13 April 2006 available at 
http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/russian-federation-april-13-2006-translation-available (accessed 24 
August 2017).  
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usage where the contract of sale was based on one of the traditional trade terms but the 
parties failed to indicate its definition.97 However, in none of these cases the courts 
endeavoured to establish whether the Incoterms® rules are widely recognised and 
applied as international trade usage in order to meet the requirements of Article 9(2) 
CISG.98 As the Incoterms® rules do not simply codify existing mercantile custom but 
also contain improvements formulated by the ICC due to periodic revisions of the 
compilation, it is highly improbable that the rules would qualify as international trade 
custom.99 Judges, furthermore, could only apply them as custom if the majority of 
industries in that particular trade follow such a practice. To establish that would require 
empirical studies, which do not exist to date. Moreover, whether the mercantile 
community at large has legitimised the Incoterms® rules as custom, and therefore as 
law across all trades, would depend on how frequently they are used internationally. In 
turn, that would be difficult to measure beyond mere anecdotal evidence as surveys on 
the use of Incoterms® rules are inconclusive on this aspect.100  
One might argue that decisions such as those of the US courts referred to above101 
are to be construed as an application of the lex mercatoria and therefore as a form of 
privately made autonomous law. Scholars have also observed that English and German 
courts tend to apply the Incoterms® rules in a manner similar to the application of 
statutory law. In their opinion, the rules should be regarded as privately made law of 
general application.102 As their content is set out in the ICC’s publication, a judge can 
simply take judicial notice of the Incoterms® rules without any need for proof and 
therefore imply them by law. In coming to their conclusion, these scholars note the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Incoterms® rules. Moreover, unlike customary 
practices, which are dependent on regular observance in the majority of trades, courts 
 
97 BP Oil International v Empresa Estatal Petroleos De Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir 2003), 200 ALR Fed 
771, 2003 US App LEXIS 12013; St Paul Guardian Insurance v Neuromed Medical Systems and Support 
GmbH, 2002 WL 465312 (SDNY), No 00 Civ 9344 (SHS), 2002 US Dist LEXIS 5096; China North Chemical 
Industries Corporation v Beston Chemical Corporation Civ A H-04-0912; 200 US Dist LEXIS 35464. See 
also Switzerland 28 January 2009 Tribunal Cantonal [Appellate Court] available at 
http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/switzerland-tribunal-cantonal-appellate-court-du-jura-18 (accessed 
9 March 2017). 
98 Johnson WP “Analysis of Incoterms as usage under article 9 of the CISG” (2013) 35 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 379 at 409-410 & 414-415. 
99 Schmidt-Kessel M “Article 9” in Schwenzer I (ed) Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG) 4th ed Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016) at 
para 27; Ferrari F “Trade usage and practice established between the parties under the CISG” (2003) 5 
International Business Law Journal 571 at 575-576; Ramberg (2011) at 423.  
100 School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary, University of London “2010 International 
Arbitration Survey: choices on international arbitration” available at 
www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf 
(accessed 9 April 2019) , at 15 indicated that on an international scale across various trades, the 
Incoterms® rules are only used “sometimes”. Surveys such as these are limited insofar as it is 
impossible to include all countries and trades. 
101 See fn 97 above.  
102 Calliess & Jarass (2018) at 18-21. 
 
  PRIVATE REGULATION: INTERNATIONAL SALES CONTRACTS 
 
Page | 42  
 
may have a greater discretion to apply international forms of soft law.103 As worldwide 
the Incoterms® rules are the definitions most often used to interpret trade terms,104 
courts can use them as an interpretative tool to establish or supplement the intention of 
the parties where they contracted on a trade term but failed to incorporate the 
Incoterms® rules explicitly.   
In summary, standard contracts can provide an adequate de facto legal framework 
in contexts where there is little harmonisation or modernisation of the law. Moreover, 
because they are based on party agreement, they can easily be adapted to changed 
circumstances.  
3.3. Mercantile custom and trade usage 
Mercantile custom and trade usage obtain their legitimacy from the fact that they are 
well-known homogenous practices that exist in a particular trade or geographic location 
and that those engaged in that trade or region regularly observe them as binding on 
them. In the context of international sales generic custom is exceptional. If it were to 
exist as a source of law, stringent requirements must be met. Although these 
requirements differ from one legal system to the next, the factual existence of a custom 
or well-established practice (usus) and the belief that such practice is binding on its 
users (opinio iuris) are generally required.105  
Most legal systems treat trade usage as implied contract terms. As for the CISG, 
trade custom or usage prevails over all its provisions. Unless the parties have 
contracted out, a trade usage which the parties knew or ought to have known and which 
is regularly observed in international trade will regulate the parties’ agreement.106 
Whether that means incorporation by law or through implied agreement is not always 
that clear. However, it seems that implied agreement would prevail.107 Other 
international instruments of unification and harmonisation, such as, the UNIDROIT 
Principles for International Commercial Contracts (PICC) and the Principles of 
European Contract Law (PECL), have done away with the requirement of implied 
knowledge, but they still require that the usage must be regularly applied in that 
particular trade when doing business internationally.108 This burden of proof is not 
always easy to discharge, especially  in modern international trade where evolving 
technology strongly influences mercantile practices.  
Developing countries are often sceptical regarding the application of trade usages 
and customs, especially when that involves the practices of developed countries. The 
 
 
103 Cafaggi F “New foundations of transnational private regulation” (2010) European University Institute, 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Private Regulation Series-04 EUI Working Paper 
RSCAS 2010/5 at 27.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
104 Johnson (2013) at 386.                                             
105 Goode (1997) at 4 & 9. 
106 Article 9(2) CISG. 
107 Schmidt-Kessel (2016) at para 13. 
108 Articles 1.9 PICC and 1:105 PECL. 
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drafting history of Article 9 CISG is  testimony to such fears, which resulted in the 
current compromise provision.109 It is concluded that, in a developmental context, trade 
usage would not always be the most efficient instrument due to these negative 
connotations. Courts, therefore, must be very careful when incorporating a trade usage, 
and make sure that the usage is indeed well-known and regularly observed to ensure its 
legitimacy.    
3.4 Codes of conduct, international standards, recommendations, guidelines and 
other private regulatory regimes 
Primarily, this category of privately formulated rules is used to address the absence of 
public regulation or to increase the standard of existing State regulation.110 These rules 
cover a wide range of topicss. However, for purposes of this article the discussion 
focuses on privately generated rules, norms and standards pertaining to technical, 
health, safety, labour, environmental and other sustainability matters as they appear in 
the context of supply chain contracts, especially where one of the parties is situated in a 
developing country.  
To speak to their social responsibilities, multinational corporations often formulate 
standards and codes of conduct to regulate their own behaviour and that of their 
employees, suppliers and subcontractors. Very often, these companies adopt the code of 
conduct as a unilateral declaration in order to meet institutionalised expectations, 
moral obligations, or to obtain a competitive advantage in attracting customers and 
employees, but they have no intention that the code will have any legal implications.111  
However, market pressure from consumers, non-governmental societies and other 
groups can provide an additional incentive for companies to adopt responsible business 
practices, and to require the same of their suppliers and other contract parties.112 These 
standards are then included in framework contracts, or incorporated as sustainability 
clauses into the terms or conditions of contracts they conclude with suppliers or 
buyers.113 Companies can also make use of private international or regional standards 
and codes, which they then incorporate into their contracts by reference.  
It remains debatable whether unilateral personal commitments and undertakings 
set out in a code of conduct are enforceable, even if contractually incorporated, as it 
would depend on the intention with which the unilateral obligation was made before it 
can bind the promisor. National laws hold different views on the unilateral creation of 
contractual obligations due to different doctrinal concepts regulating this aspect. 
 
109 See Goldstajn A “Usages of trade and other autonomous rules of international trade according to the 
UN (1980) Sales Convention” in Sarcevic P & Volken P (eds) International sale of goods: Dubrovnik 
lectures New York: Oceana Publications (1986) 55 at 77-85.  
110 McAllister (2014) at 293.  
111 Beckers (2016) at 10.  
112 According to McAllister (2014) at 305, with reference to Vogel D “The private regulation of global 
corporate conduct: achievement and limitations” (2010) 49 Business and Society 68 at 71-72, there are 
voluntary codes for every global industry and internationally traded commodity. 
113 Beckers (2016) at 17. 
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However, in the context of international trade law, courts might be prepared to respect 
legitimate expectations by virtue of promissory estoppel.114 International case law fails 
to provide a uniform position. It sometimes bends over backwards to pronounce these 
obligations as binding if addressed to parties who need special legal protection, such as, 
a company’s own employees115 or consumers,116 but the same does not apply to the 
employees of suppliers, local communities or others affected by non-compliance with a 
company’s undertakings.117  
Over time, practices may develop into trade usage. However, where privately 
produced rules are periodically reviewed they are less likely to ever reach the status of 
trade usage, and their application would be confined to contract terms. Where these 
rules are self-regulatory in nature, compliance would largely depend on how 
transparent a company is about its operations or whether it is assessed externally by 
another entity, for example, through certification procedures conducted by an 
independent third party such as a compliance authority, or through peer review. 
Corporate codes of conduct may rely on a mixture of national law, international soft 
law and the specification of autonomous standards, which means they are based on 
both public and private methods of regulation.118 However, contract remains the main 
mechanism whereby companies can harden soft law rules contained in codes of conduct 
and international standardisation codes119 in order to ensure that their employees and 
suppliers fulfil their duties in accordance with such codes. Presently, the most effective 
remedy for non-compliance by a supplier lies in informal measures based on 
reputational sanctions and market pressures, or  in private enforcement mechanisms 
provided  in the contract, code of conduct or other formulated standard. Measures 
focused on compliance and prevention are often far better remedies than traditional 
breach of contract remedies, such as cancellation and specific performance that provide 
ex post facto relief but do not ensure compliance.120 These methods are also better 
suited for international transactions where the enforcement of judgements in foreign 
jurisdictions cannot be guaranteed. 
 
114 Beckers (2016) at 14. 
115 Beckers (2016) at 15. In ArbG Wuppertal, NZA-RR 2005, 476; LAG Düsseldorf NZA-RR 2006, 81 the 
German courts argued that Walmart’s unilateral code of conduct constituted rights and obligations for 
its German employees in order to reconcile their legal position with their constitutional rights.  
116 Beckers (2016) at 15-16. See also Case C-96/00 Rudolf Gabriel [2002] ECR I-06367; Case C-27/02 
Petra Engler v Janus Versand GmbH [2005] ECR I-00481; Case C-180/06 Renate Ilsinger v Martin 
Dreschers [2009] ECR I-3961. In these cases, the European Court of Justice held that unilateral 
promises made for marketing purposes can be understood as being of a contractual nature. 
117 Beckers (2016) at 16. Note however a positive turn in the recent landmark decision of the UK Supreme 
Court in Vedanta Resources PLC v Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, based on the duty of care of a parent 
company towards its subsidiary. 
118 Beckers (2016) at 12-13. 
119 Beckers (2016) at 12; Cafaggi (2011) at 47. 
120 Beckers (2016) at 19. 
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State law should therefore not only recognise the regulatory role of corporations 
and other private regulators but also the regulatory character of contract.121 However, 
in this context, how does one reconcile contract law with the social aims of sustainable 
development as envisaged by corporate codes of conduct? Traditionally, the role of 
contract law has been to regulate the intentions of contract parties, whilst the aim of 
corporate conduct rules is to regulate the public interest.122 Furthermore, doctrines of 
contract law do not account for procedural legitimacy while that is a prerequisite when 
protecting matters of public interest.123 Where a company unilaterally formulates its 
code of conduct and thereafter imposes it contractually on its suppliers and other 
contract parties, the rules might not qualify as procedurally legitimate and could be 
challenged on that ground.124 Moreover, where a company does not comply with its 
own code of conduct and as a result its own employees, or those of its suppliers, suffer 
detriment because of human rights abuses or safety compromises, contractual remedies 
might be to no avail.125  
The same applies where societies, or the environment, are harmed by the 
operations of a company or its subsidiaries. In these circumstances, there is no direct 
contractual relationship between the company and the aggrieved person due to the 
principle of privity of contract. Consequently, there might be no legal relief based on 
contract, unless the corporate code explicitly provides remedies therefor .126 In general, 
this would require a re-think of contract law doctrine on third party rights, some 
innovation, and a willingness on the part of courts to interpret contractual terms with 
reference to their context and not merely formalistically.127 Although external 
compliance mechanisms are useful to ensure objectivity and impartiality, those that are 
potentially interested in compliance with the rules, including third parties, must have 
access to such dispute resolution mechanisms in case of non-compliance, for them to 
have any effect.128  
 
121 Beckers (2016) at 24-26. 
122 Beckers (2016) at 20. 
123 Beckers (2016) at 21. 
124 Beckers (2016) at 22. Arguments could, however, be made  that requirements of transparency, 
participation and accountability contradict the principles of party autonomy and privity of contract, 
and that the former considerations should not play a role once these terms are contractually 
incorporated.  
125 See Doe v Walmart Stores Inc 527F 3d 677 (9th Cir 2009) where the claim of a supplier’s employees 
was dismissed. 
126 Beckers (2016) at 19; Cafaggi (2013) at 1568-1569 & 1591-1595. Remedies might be available in tort, 
or on a construction of agency where the seller acts as agent of the interested party. Other possibilities 
would be warranties, doctrines for the benefit of third parties, or the principles of unjust enrichment. 
See also references in fn 114 above where German courts were prepared to assist employees on the 
basis of constitutional rights. 
127 Beckers (2016) at 22-23. 
128 Cafaggi (2015) at 904-8, 931 & 933-934. 
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Although there are a number of similarities between modern forms of private 
regulation and custom, there are also distinct differences. Whilst custom develops 
spontaneously, private regulatory regimes do not arise organically but are formulated 
in standard contracts, codes of conduct, regulatory contracts, rule books, and other 
agreements to implement standards. They, therefore, are rules based.129 Furthermore, 
as these forms of private regulation are regularly revised, they will not easily reach the 
status of custom as that would require homogeneity in practice.130 Furthermore, custom 
harmonises existing business practices, whilst privately generated standards are often 
“forward-thinking” insofar as they regulate matters that the state has failed to address 
or addressed inadequately.131  
An inclusive and democratic participatory process could facilitate the legitimacy of 
rules and standards formulated by industry associations, international agencies or 
standard setting organisations. However, it does not suffice that the rules alone are the 
product of democratic processes. In addition, there must be clear procedural rules that 
apply to compliance and enforcements mechanisms, especially if they are internal 
processes. Equally problematic are instances where the creation of the enforcement 
mechanism lacks procedural legitimacy.132 However, where the necessary processes 
were followed in conferring legitimacy on these rules, one can argue that these forms of 
private regulation are privately made law with the same legal effect and force as State-
based law. Even though they would primarily function as soft law, or as implied terms, 
there might also be room for their application as terms implied by law.  
4. CONCLUSION 
Non-State actors increasingly generate international rules, norms and standards by 
which they regulate themselves and which have the effect of law. This article has 
focused on the role of contract as a vehicle through which private forms of regulation 
find application in the context of international trade. As they mainly find application as 
contract terms, and not as autonomous law, private forms of regulation are subject to 
the applicable law of the contract. This means that they continue to function within the 
framework of State law, but in supplementation thereof. Private forms of regulation, 
such as, standard form contracts formulated by trade associations and the private 
regulatory frameworks set by international standard-setting organisations, often make 
provision for their own adjudication bodies and enforcement mechanisms to address 
disputes and ensure compliance outside the traditional structure of the courts through 
arbitration or other forms of dispute resolution. Once parties have agreed to comply 
with the rules and standards set by private organisations, they have also agreed to the 
procedures and processes put in place to ensure compliance. As a result, these contracts 
become a form of self-regulation or self-ordering. Most legal systems will allow that by 
 
129 Cafaggi (2015) at 899-900, 926 & 928; Maurer (2012) at 9. 
130 Cafaggi (2015) at 899 & 901. 
131 Cafaggi (2015) at 925-927. Transnational private regulation is also capable of fulfilling a 
harmonisation function where there are different local forms of private regulation in place. 
132 Beckers (2016) at 22. 
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virtue of the notions of party autonomy and freedom of contract as long as those 
contracts do not conflict with applicable mandatory law or public policy.  
Private forms of international regulation, however, can only assume the label of 
privately made law if they are of general application so that they apply to a variety of 
trades and are capable of also regulating the legal position of parties outside a 
particular trade. To ensure the legitimacy of privately generated standards, 
independent standard-setting authorities must follow an inclusionary participatory 
process that includes all interested parties. Dispute resolution mechanisms must also 
provide clearly formulated and legitimate procedures. Being soft law, they can only 
“harden” into law through party agreement, unless a case can be made  that the 
particular example of private regulation reflects or constitutes a custom or trade usage.  
However, to prove that would not be an easy task,  and in most instances it would not 
meet the requirements for trade usage and custom.   
How do private forms of regulation find application in the absence of express 
contractual incorporation? Contract interpretation could play an important role here. 
Courts can interpret the contract so that an intention to incorporate these instruments 
would be implied. In the process, privately generated rules and standards formulated by 
highly respected and wellknown international trade organisations could be used to 
establish an “international” interpretation of the terms of the contract.133 However, once 
incorporated, they would only address the rights and obligations of the parties to the 
contract and not the rights and obligations of outsiders who are affected by the conduct 
of those party to the contract. To overcome the limitations brought about by the 
principle of privity of contract  would necessitate a pragmatic and contextual 
interpretation of sustainability clauses, which supports fundamental human rights, good 
faith and fair dealing. However, where private forms of regulation obtain their 
legitimacy in procedures similar to those through which State law is produced, it is 
suggested that courts should apply them as law, albeit privately made law.  
This article has not only identified the importance of contract as a vehicle for 
private regulation but has also touched on the dual role of contract in modern 
international commercial practice and sales law. On the one hand, contract law still 
fulfils its traditional role of regulating the exchange of goods for money. By ordering the 
parties’ rights and obligations in a manner that addresses the needs of the parties at a 
private level it can facilitate economic wealth. On the other hand, contract has become a 
regulatory instrument that seeks to govern in areas which traditionally belonged to 
public law. In the context of sustainability and social responsibility, contracts function 
as a regulatory instrument that incorporates private norms, standards and adjudication 
procedures formulated by international standard setting  organisations. In this manner, 
private forms of regulation govern areas that the default law of contract and State law in 
general do not address. With some innovation, the legal effect of the privately 
formulated regimes can be extended to third parties so that these rules and standards 
 
133 See Dalhuisen JH “Globalization and the transnationalization of commercial and financial law” (2015) 
67 Rutgers University Law Review 40 at 41. 
 
  PRIVATE REGULATION: INTERNATIONAL SALES CONTRACTS 
 
Page | 48  
 
can have the effect of law. As the traditional divide between State and non-State law, as 
well as between private and public law, is becoming smaller, it necessitates a paradigm 




Calliess G-P & Zumbansen P Rough consensus and running code. A theory of transnational 
private law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2010).   
Jansen N The making of legal authority Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010). 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588763.001.0001 
Van der Merwe S, Van Huyssteen LF, Reinecke MFB & Lubbe GF Contract: general 
principles 5th ed Cape Town: Juta (2016). 
Chapters in books 
Berman PS “The evolution of global legal pluralism”  in Cotterell R & Del Mar M (eds) 
Authority in transnational legal theory: theorizing across disciplines Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar (2016).  
Eiselen S “Globalization and harmonization of international trade law” in  Faure M &  
Van der Walt A (eds) Globalization and private law: the way forward Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar (2010) .  
Eiselen S “Scope of CISG” in  DiMatteo LA et al (eds) International sales law: contract 
principles & practice Baden-Baden: Nomos (2016) .  
Goldstajn A “Usages of trade and other autonomous rules of international trade 
according to the UN (1980) Sales Convention” in Sarcevic P & Volken P (eds) 
International sale of goods: Dubrovnik lectures  New York: Oceana Publications (1986) .  
Rowe MC “The contribution of the ICC to the development of international trade law” in 
Horn N & Schmitthoff CM (eds) The transnational law of international commercial 
transactions II  Deventer: Kluwer (1992) . 
Schmidt-Kessel M “Article 9” in Schwenzer I (ed) Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary 
on the UN Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG) 4th ed Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2016). 
Schmitthoff CM “The unification of the law of international trade” in Cheng J (ed) CM 
Schmitthoff”s select essays on international trade law Dordrecht: Marthinus Nijhoff 
(1988) .  
Teubner G “‘Global bukowina’: legal pluralism in the world society” in Teubner G (ed) 




  LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 24 (2020) 
 
Page | 49  
 
Journal Articles 
Basedow J "The state's private law and the economy - commercial law as an amalgam of 
public and private rule-making" (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 703. 
https://doi.org/10.5131/ajcl.2007.0024  
  
Berman PS "Global legal pluralism" (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 1155. 
  
Bernstein L "Merchant law in a merchant court: rethinking the Code's search for 
immanent business norms" (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1765. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3312639  
  




Cafaggi F "The many features of transnational private rule-making: unexplored 
relationships between custom, jura mercatorum and global private regulation" (2015) 
36 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 875. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2636359  
  
Cafaggi F "The regulatory functions of transnational commercial contracts new 
architectures" (2013) 36 Fordham International Law Journal 1557. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2153096  
  
Cafaggi F "New foundations of transnational private regulation" (2011) 38(1) Journal of 
Law and Society 20. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2011.00533.x  
  
Cuniberti G "Three theories of lex mercatoria" (2014) 52 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 369. 
  
Dalhuisen JH "Custom and its revival in transnational private law" (2008) 18 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 339. 
  
DiMatteo LA "Soft law and the principle of fair and equitable decision making in 
international contract arbitration" 2013 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 221. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cjcl/cxt013  
  
Ferrari F "Trade usage and practice established between the parties under the CISG" 
(2003) 5 International Business Law Journal 571. 
  
Flanagan PM "Demythologising the law merchant: the impropriety of the lex mercatoria 
as a choice of law" 2004 International Company and Commercial Law Review 297. 
  
 
  PRIVATE REGULATION: INTERNATIONAL SALES CONTRACTS 
 
Page | 50  
 
Goode R "Rule, practice, and pragmatism in transnational commercial law" (2005) 
54(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 539. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/iclq/lei017  
  
Goode R "Usage and its reception in transnational commercial law" (1997) 46(1) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589300060097  
  
Johnson WP "Analysis of Incoterms as usage under article 9 of the CISG" (2013) 35 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 379. 
  
Kjaer PF "From the private to the public to the private? Historicizing the evolution of 
public and private authority" (2018) 25(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 13. 
https://doi.org/10.2979/indjglolegstu.25.1.0013  
  
Levit JK "A bottom-up approach to international lawmaking: the tale of three trade 
finance instruments" (2005) 30 Yale Journal of International Law 125. 
  
Maniruzzaman AFM "The lex mercatoria and international contracts: a challenge for 
international commercial arbitration" (1999) 14 American University International Law 
Review 657. 
  
McAllister LK "Harnessing private regulation" (2014) 3 Michigan Journal of 
Environmental and Administrative Law 291. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2315253  
  
Michaels R "The true lex mercatoria: law beyond the state" (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 447. 
https://doi.org/10.2979/gls.2007.14.2.447  
  
Ochoa C "The relationship of participatory democracy to participatory law formation" 
(2008) 15 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5. 
https://doi.org/10.2979/gls.2008.15.1.5  
  
Quinn PS "Regulation in the shadows of private law" (2018) 28 Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law 327. 
  
Ramberg J "Incoterms® 2010" (2011) 29 Penn State International Law Review 415. 
  





  LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 24 (2020) 
 
Page | 51  
 
Schiek D "Private rule-making and European governance - issues of legitimacy" (2007) 
European Law Review 443. 
  
Schwartz A & Scott RE "Contract theory and the limits of contract law" (2003) 113 The 
Yale Law Journal 541. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3657531  
  
Snyder DV "Private lawmaking" (2003) 64 Ohio State Law Journal 371. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.397301  
  
Vogel D "The private regulation of global corporate conduct: achievement and 
limitations" (2010) 49 Business and Society 68. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650309343407  
  
Yuan B "A law and economics approach to norms in transnational commercial 




Treaties and Conventions and other International Documents 
2030 United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development UN Doc A/Res/70/1. 
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).  
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996). 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC).  
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980). 
Case law 
ArbG Wuppertal, NZA-RR 2005, 476. 
BP Oil International v Empresa Estatal Petroleos De Ecuador 332 F 3d 333 (5th Cir 2003), 
200 ALR Fed 771, 2003 US App LEXIS 12013.  
 
Case C-180/06 Renate Ilsinger v Martin Dreschers [2009] ECR I-3961. 
Case C-27/02 Petra Engler v Janus Versand GmbH [2005] ECR I-00481.  
Case C-96/00 Rudolf Gabriel [2002] ECR I-06367. 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Case No 
CISG/1997/09 of 24 April 1997 available at http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/china-
international-economic-trade-arbitration-association-cietac-prc-60 (accessed 14 
September 2017). 
 
  PRIVATE REGULATION: INTERNATIONAL SALES CONTRACTS 
 
Page | 52  
 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Case No 
CISG/1997/16 of 25 June 1997 available at http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/china-
june-25-1997-translation-available (accessed 28 July 2017). 
China International Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) (PRC) Case No 
CISG/1999/20 of 7 April 1999 available at http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/china-
april-7-1999-translation-available (accessed 10 November 2017). 
China North Chemical Industries Corporation v Beston Chemical Corporation Civ A H-04-
0912; 200 US Dist LEXIS 35464.  
Doe v Walmart Stores Inc 527F 3d 677 (9th Cir 2009). 
LAG Düsseldorf NZA-RR 2006, 81. 
Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of 
Commerce Case No 406/1998 of 6 June 2000 available at 
http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/russian-federation-june-6-2000-translation-
available (accessed 24 May 2017).  
The International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Russian Federation Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Case No 105/2005 of 13 April 2006 available at 
http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/russian-federation-april-13-2006-translation-
available (accessed 24 August 2017).  
St Paul Guardian Insurance v Neuromed Medical Systems and Support GmbH, 2002 WL 
465312 (SDNY), No 00 Civ 9344 (SHS), 2002 US Dist LEXIS 5096. 
Switzerland 28 January 2009 Tribunal Cantonal [Appellate Court] available at 
http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/case/switzerland-tribunal-cantonal-appellate-court-du-
jura-18 (accessed 9 March 2017). 
Vedanta Resources PLC v Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20. 
Internet and other sources (Working papers) 
Beckers A “Regulating corporate regulators through contract law? The case of corporate 
social responsibility” 2016 EUI Working Papers Max Weber Programme (MWP) 2016/12        
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2789360 (accessed 9 April 2019).    
 
Bernstein L “Merchant law in a modern economy” (2013) University of Chicago Coase-
Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No 639 (2nd series) available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2242490 (accessed 9 April 2019). 
Cafaggi F “New foundations of transnational private regulation” (2010) European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Private 
Regulation Series-04 EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/53.  
Calliess G-P and Jarass IS “Private uniform law and global legal pluralism: the case of 
ICC’s Incoterms and UCP” (2018) The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, 
Transnational Law Institute Think! Paper 12/2018 available at 
https//ssrn.com/abstract=3184731 (accessed 9 April 2019). 
 
  LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 24 (2020) 
 
Page | 53  
 
 
Mak V “Private actors as norm-setters. On new legal pluralism in European regulatory 
private law and how to manage it” 2015 Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series No. 02/2015 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566672 (accessed 9 
April 2019).  
 
Mak V “Who does what in European private law – and how is it done? An 
experimentalist perspective” 2017 Tilburg Private Law Working Paper Series No 
05/2017 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2958146 (accessed 9 April 2019). 
Maurer A “The creation of transnational law – participatory legitimacy of privately 
created norms” (2012) Center for Transnational Studies (ZenTra) of the Universities of 
Bremen and Oldenburg Working Papers in Transnational Law No 03/2012 available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179584 (accessed 9 April 2019). 
School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary, University of London “2010 
International Arbitration Survey: choices on international arbitration” available at 
www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSu
rveyReport.pdf (accessed 9 April 2019). 
Smits J “The future of contract law in Europe” (2015) Maastricht European Private Law 
Institute Working Paper No 2125/2 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566149 
(accessed 9 April 2019). 
 
